Responsible Disclosure of Odoo Security Vulnerabilities
Help us keep Odoo safe and secure!
Responsible Disclosure Policy
The safety of Odoo systems is very important to us (not only because we use Odoo internally), and we consider security problems with the highest priority. We do our best every day to protect Odoo users from known security threats, and we welcome all reports of security vulnerabilities discovered by our users and contributors.
We are committed to handle vulnerability reports with the greatest attention, provided that the following rules are respected.
Reporting an issue
Please note: we receive a majority of security reports that have little to no impact on the security of Odoo or Odoo Online, and we ultimately have to reject them. To avoid a disappointing experience when contacting us, please try to put together a proof-of-concept attack and take a critical look at what's really at risk. If the proposed attack scenario turns out unrealistic, your report will probably be rejected. Also be sure to review our list of non-qualifying issues below.
You may send this report from an anonymous email account, although we promise not to disclose your identity if you do not want us to.
You can also encrypt and verify messages to/from our security team with the GPG key linked above.
Incident Response Procedure
- You privately share the details of the security vulnerability with our Security Team by reporting an issue (see above)
- We acknowledge your submission and verify the vulnerability. Our first answer generally comes under 48h.
- If the vulnerability is valid and in scope, we request a CVE ID and give it to you as soon as it is assigned.
- We work on a correction in collaboration with you.
- We write a detailed Security Advisory describing the issue, its impacts, possible workarounds and solution, and we ask you to review it
- We privately broadcast the Security Advisory and the correction to stakeholders and customers with an Odoo Enterprise Contract
- We give stakeholders and customers a reasonable delay to apply the correction, before disclosing it publicly (e.g. 2-3 weeks)
- We disclose and broadcast the Security Advisory and the correction on our public channels.
We ask you to observe the following rules at all times:
- Exclusively test vulnerabilities on your own deployments, on demo.odoo.com, or on your own trial instances of Odoo Online
- Never attempt to access or modify data that does not belong to you
- Never attempt to execute denial of service attacks, or to compromise the reliability and integrity of services that do not belong to you
- Do not use scanners or automated tools to find vulnerabilities, as their effects could violate the previous rules (unless you can guarantee that they will be throttled to less than 5 requests/second, and will not break any other rules)
- Never attempt non-technical attacks such as social engineering, phishing, or physical attacks against anyone or any system
- Do not publicly disclose vulnerabilities without our prior consent (see also the Disclosure Procedure above). During the non-disclosure period you are authorized to use/test any correction we've provided, as long as no emphasis is put on that correction and it is not published in the form of a security report (i.e. using it on production servers is fine).
- We will not initiate legal action against you if you followed the rules
- We will process your report and respond as quickly as possible
- We will provide a fix as soon as possible
- We will work diligently with stakeholders and customers in order to help them restore the safety of their systems
- We will not publicly disclose your identity if you do not want to be credited for your discovery
What to report?
Qualifying vulnerabilities - DO REPORT!
- SQL injection vectors in public API methods
- XSS vulnerabilities working in supported browsers
- Broken authentication or session management, allowing unauthorized access
- Broken sandboxing of customizations, allowing arbitrary code execution or access to system resources
NON Qualifying vulnerabilities - DO NOT REPORT!
- XSS vulnerabilities working only in unsupported/deprecated browsers, or requiring relaxed security settings
- Self-XSS attacks requiring the user to actively copy/paste malicious code into their own browser window
- "XSS attacks" by admins, e.g. via file uploads (SVG, HTML, JS, ...) or script injection. Administrators are webmasters, security restrictions don't apply to them, this is a feature.
- Rate-limiting / Brute-forcing / Scripting of components working as designed (e.g. password authentication, password reset, etc.)
- User enumeration (ability to verify that a username exists). Does not carry much risk, and can't be prevented without deteriorating the user experience.
- File path disclosures, which do not carry significant risk and do not enable attacks that would be otherwise impossible
- Clickjacking or phishing attacks using social engineering tricks to abuse users, with the system working as intended
- Tabnapping or other phishing attacks conducted by navigating other browser tabs
- Logout CSRF (no plausible attack + not preventable e.g. via cookie tossing or cookie jar overflow)
- Open redirectors, which are simply one vector for phishing among many others ( see our detailed explanation)
- Reflected File Downloads, another attack technique that requires social engineering and is not very practical
- Referer leak (including sensitive tokens) via social media links or ads/analytics requests - very unlikely to be clicked, or to be exploited within validity period by those mainstream companies!
- More generally, attacks relying on physical or social engineering techniques will usually be rejected
- Non-permanent Denial of Service (DoS) and distributed DoS (DDoS) that maintain resource exhaustion (cpu/network/memory) via a sustained stream of requests/packets
- Password policies (length, format, character classes, etc.)
- Missing or partial verification of email addresses
- Disclosure of public information or information that does not carry significant risks (directory listing on our downloads archive is a required feature! ;-))
- Spam-fighting policies and systems such as DKIM, SPF or DMARC
Absence of HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) headers, HSTS preloading, and HSTS policies
Weak ciphers or SSL deployments details. Our benchmark is an A grade on SSLLab's test yet a maximal compatibility with user browsers. We are currently phasing out TLS 1.0 on www.odoo.com, already done for our customer hosting services
- SSRF attacks, unless they allow access to special protocol handlers (e.g. file://), or can be used in a working scenario to bypass access control on the Odoo Cloud Hosting (cfr deployment documentation)
- Issues in default configuration of access control rules (e.g. ACLs and record rules) - please open regular bug reports instead
- Attack scenarios that include a takeover of user email accounts
If you have any doubt, please ask us first!
If you report a new security issue that is confirmed to be critical (see the DO REPORT section), we will publicly thank you by adding your name to the Odoo Security Hall of Fame, on the right of this page.
We are extremely grateful to the following security researchers who have worked with us to further improve the security of Odoo and the Odoo Cloud platforms!
|Nils Hamerlinck |
|2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016|
|Colin Newell||2017, 2016, 2015|
|IBS Group||2019, 2018, 2017, 2015|
|Naglis Jonaitis ||2018, 2017, 2016, 2015|
|Swapnesh Shah||2019, 2018|
|Ondřej Kuzník||2017, 2016, 2015|
|Florent Mirieu de Labarre||2019, 2018|
|Alexandre Díaz||2021, 2020|
|Yenthe Van Ginneken||2019, 2018|
|Santosh Kumar Sha||2020|
|Christopher Riis Bubeck Eriksen||2020|
|"Raspina Net Pars Group"||2020|
|Agustín Ezequiel Maio||2019|
|Lauri Vakkala (Silverskin)||2019|
|P. Valov (SoCyber)||2019|
|Nathanael ROTA (Capgemini)||2019|
|Subash SN (Appsecco)||2019|
|Bharath Kumar (Appsecco)||2019|
|Aitor Fuentes (kr0no)||2019|
|Erwin van der Ploeg (Odoo Experts)||2018|
|Benoît Chenal (Excellium-services – Application Security)||2018|
|Adan Álvarez (A2secure)||2018|
|Bharath Kumar (Appsecco)||2018|
|Subash SN (Appsecco)||2018|
|Stéphane Bidoul (ACSONE)||2018|
|Andrew Grasso |
|Romain E Silva (Sysdream)||2017|
|Adel Nettar (Sysdream)||2017|
|"Ayrx" via SSD||2017|
|Vibhuti Ranjan Vidyarshy Nath||2016|
|Leonardo Pistone (Camptocamp France)||2015|
|Mohamed Khaled Fathy||2015|
|Dipak Kumar Das||2015|
|Muhammed Gamal Fahmy||2015|
|ONESTEiN / Glasswall||2015|
|Sven Schleier, KPMG Management Consulting, SG||2015|
|Ondřej Kuzník & Craig Gowing, credativ Ltd||2015|
|Vo Minh Thu||2013|