



# 10 RULES

FOR

**SAFER**

**CODE**

# RULE #1

## EVAL IS EVIL

Don't trust **strings** supposed to contain **expressions** or **code**  
(even your own!)

# “eval” breaks the barrier between **code** and **data**

```
result = self.env.ref('account.%s' % (xml_id)).read()[0]  
invoice_domain = eval(result['domain'])
```


Is this safe?

**Maybe**...it depends.

Is it a good idea?


**No**, because eval() is **not** necessary!

# There are **safer** and **smarter** ways to **parse** data in **PYTHON**





# There are **safer** and **smarter** ways to **parse** data in **JAVASCRIPT**




# If you must eval **parameters** use a **safe** eval method

Show your meaning!

PYTHON

Import as "**safe\_eval**", not as "eval"!




```
# YES
from odoo.tools import safe_eval
res = safe_eval('foo', {'foo': 42});
```




```
# NO
from odoo.tools import safe_eval as eval
res = eval('foo', {'foo': 42});
```

Alias built-in eval as "**unsafe\_eval**"



```
# YES
unsafe_eval = eval
res = unsafe_eval(trusted_code);
```



```
# NO!
res = eval(trusted_code);
```

# If you must eval **parameters** use a **safe** eval method

Do not use the built-in JS eval!

JAVASCRIPT

```
// py.js is included by default  
py.eval('foo', {'foo': 42});  
  
// require("web.pyeval") for  
// domains/contexts/groupby evaluation  
pyeval.eval('domains', my_domain);
```

# 50%

of **vulnerabilities** found every year include  
remote code execution injected via  
**unsafe eval**





# RULE #2

**YOU SHALL NOT  
PICKLE**

Don't use it. Ever. Use JSON.



A human skull and crossbones are positioned on a dark, textured surface. The skull is centered, with its jaw open, revealing teeth. Two long, dark bones are crossed behind the skull, forming an 'X' shape. The background is a dark, mottled grey with some lighter spots.

“

Warning: The ***pickle*** module is not intended to be secure against erroneous or maliciously constructed data. *Never unpickle* data received from an *untrusted* or *unauthenticated* source.

”




# Python's pickle serialization is:

+unsafe +not portable

+unreadable

```
pickle.dumps({"widget": "monetary"}) == "(dp0\nS'widget'\np1\nS'monetary'\np2\ns."
```



Actually a  
stack-based  
language!

# Pickle is **unsafe** Seriously.

```
>>> yummy = "cos\nsystem\n(S'cat /etc/shadow | head -n 5'\ntR.'\ntR."  
>>> pickle.loads(yummy)  
root:$6$m7ndoM3p$JRVXomVQFn/KH81DEePpX98usSoESUnm13e6N1f.:14951:0:99999:7:::  
daemon:x:14592:0:99999:7:::  
(...  
>>>
```



# Use JSON instead!

```
json.dumps({"widget": "monetary"}) == '{"widget": "monetary"}'
```



+safe +portable  
+readable

# RULE #3

## USE THE CURSOR WISELY

Use the **ORM API**. And when you can't, use **query parameters**.

# SQL injection is a classical privilege escalation vector

The **ORM** is here to help you build safe queries:

```
self.search(domain)
```

**Psycopg** can also help you do that, if you tell it what is **code** and what is **data**:

```
query = """SELECT * FROM res_partner  
        WHERE id IN %s"""  
self._cr.execute(query, (tuple(ids),))
```

SQL code

SQL data parameters

Learn the API to avoid hurting  
yourself  
and  
other people!





# This method is vulnerable to SQL injection


```
def compute_balance_by_category(self, categ='in'):  
    query = """SELECT sum(debit-credit)  
                FROM account_invoice_line l  
                JOIN account_invoice i ON (l.invoice_id = i.id)  
                WHERE i.categ = '%s_invoice'  
                GROUP BY i.partner_id """  
    self._cr.execute(query % categ)  
    return self._cr.fetchall()
```

What if someone calls it with

```
categ = """in_invoice'; UPDATE res_users  
SET password = 'god' WHERE id=1; SELECT  
sum(debit-credit) FROM account_invoice_line  
WHERE name = '"""
```

# This method is **still** vulnerable to SQL injection

Now  
private!



```
def _compute_balance_by_category(self, categ='in'):  
    query = """SELECT sum(debit-credit)  
                FROM account_invoice_line l  
                JOIN account_invoice i ON (l.invoice_id = i.id)  
                WHERE i.categ = '%s_invoice'  
                GROUP BY i.partner_id """  
    self._cr.execute(query % categ)  
    return self._cr.fetchall()
```

Better, but it could still be called  
indirectly!

# This method is **still** vulnerable to SQL injection

```
def _compute_balance_by_category(self, categ='in'):  
    assert categ in ('in', 'out')  
    query = """SELECT sum(debit-credit)  
                FROM account_invoice_line l  
                JOIN account_invoice i ON (l.invoice_id = i.id)  
                WHERE i.categ = '%s_invoice'  
                GROUP BY i.partner_id """  
    self._cr.execute(query % categ)  
    return self._cr.fetchall()
```

Now checked  
with assert!

Better, but **assert** can be optimized  
out and **ignored**  
(e.g. in Windows builds)

# This method is **safe** against SQL injection

```
def _compute_balance_by_category(self, categ='in'):
```

```
    categ = '%s_invoice' % categ
```

```
    query = """SELECT sum(debit-credit)
                FROM account_invoice_line l
                JOIN account_invoice i ON (l.invoice_id = i.id)
                WHERE i.categ = %s
                GROUP BY i.partner_id """
```

```
    self._cr.execute(query, (categ,))
```

```
    return self._cr.fetchall()
```

Separates **code**  
and **parameters**!





# RULE #4

**FIGHT XSS-FORCE**  
**(T-RAW, UPLOADS, HTML FIELDS, ...)**

So many **XSS vectors** – gotta **watch** 'em all